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Driving across unknown routes used to
be stressful owing to the almost
inevitable problem of getting lost.
Thanks to Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS) navigation devices,
such problems are now in the past. These
devices have revolutionized how we
move: they guide us not only in unknown
places but also within our own neigh-
bourhoods. Our growing dependence on
them to find our way is risky though:
since the airwaves that carry GNSS sig-
nals are broadcast in the open air with a
relatively weak strength, they are vulner-
able to spoofing and meaconing attacks.
Spoofing interferes with GNSS signals
and misleads a driver into calculating a
different location. Instead of interfering,
a meaconing attack intercepts, alters or
delays GNSS signals.
Launching these attacks is illegal, but
devices required for their implementa-
tion are easy for anyone to access.
Although this may not bother many of
us, for those who run businesses that
depend on correct routing (transport of
valuable goods), spoofing and mea-
coning represent serious threats.
To address these threats, researchers from
the Interdisciplinary Centre for Security,
Reliability and Trust (SnT) of the
University of Luxembourg and engineers
from ‘itrust consulting’ Luxembourg
teamed up to execute a project funded by
the European Space Agency (from
12/2010 to 11/2012). They designed and
implemented a service that assesses the
trustworthiness of a GNSS device's claim
of being at a certain location [1]. The
service, Localization Assurance Service
Provider (LASP), runs on a trusted third
party between location-based service
providers and their users.  The architec-
ture where LASP runs is shown in
Figure 1: all communications, except for
those between GNSS and User Devices,
rely on the Internet or the data mobile net-
work infrastructure and they are sup-
posed to be secure.
The LASP enacts a system of security
checks, each check monitoring signal
properties – such as signal strength,
Doppler ratio, and clock bias [2] – that a
GNSS navigation device has measured
during localization. The outcomes of
different security checks are intelli-
gently processed based on a trust frame-
work implemented with probabilistic
conditional reasoning and subjective
logic [3]. The results are then combined
to obtain a value expressing to what
extent a given localization can be
trusted. This value, called localization
assurance level, is embedded in a certifi-
cate issued by the LASP together with
the putative user location. High assur-
ance levels are given to localizations
derived from untampered GNSS signals
while low assurance levels to localiza-
tions that have been found to have
inconsistencies likely due to spoofing.
In addition to the localization assur-
ance, SnT researchers have studied
solutions to protect location privacy.
Thanks to a technique called selective
blinding, users can control the accuracy
of the location that is contained in a
LASP certificate without invalidating
the certificate. Location-based service
providers can thus receive certified
localizations that adhere to the need-to-
know principle [4].
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The growing popularity of location-based services such as GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System)
navigation requires confidence in the reliability of the calculated locations. The exploration of a
user’s location also gives rise to severe privacy concerns. Within an ESA (European Space Agency)
funded project, we have developed a service that not only verifies the correctness of users’
locations but also enables users to control the accuracy of their revealed locations.
Figure 1: LASP service
architecture
